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There are two opposite points of view on the link between economic integration and business
cycle synchronization. De Grauwe (1997) classifies these competing views as “The European
Commission View” and “The Krugman View”. According to the European Commission (1990),
closer integration leads to less frequent asymmetric shocks and to more synchronized business
cycles between countries. On the other hand, for Krugman (1993) closer integration implies
higher specialization and, thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Drawing on the evidence
from a group of transition countries which have experienced a notable increase in trade
openness and economic integration with the European Union during the past decade, this paper
tries to determine whose argument is supported by the data. This is done by confronting
estimated time-varying coefficients of supply and demand shock asymmetry with indicators of
trade intensity and exchange rates. We find that (i) an increase in trade intensity leads to higher
symmetry of demand shocks; the effect of integration on supply shock asymmetry varies from
country to country; (ii) a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand
shock convergence. The results for demand shocks can be interpreted in favor of “The European
Commission View”, also known as the endogeneity argument by Frankel and Rose (1998) in
the  OCA criteria discussion, according to which trade links reduce asymmetries between
countries. Overall, our results support Kenen’s (2001) argument that the impact of trade
integration on shock asymmetry depends on the type of shock.
JEL Codes: E32, F30, F42.
Keywords:  EU enlargement, business cycle, trade, OCA (optimal currency area).
                                          
* Czech National Bank, Na Příkopě 28, 115 03, Prague Czech Republic. CERGE-EI, Charles University.
CNRS-ROSES, University of Paris-1. E-mail: Ian.Babetskii@cnb.cz. The author is deeply indebted to Alexis
Derviz for valuable discussions and suggestions. The comments provided by Michal Kejak, Jan Kmenta, Evžen
Kočenda, Luboš Komárek, Mathilde Maurel, Daniel Münich, Stanislav Polák, Gérard Roland, Jan Svejnar and
seminar participants at the CNB, CERGE-EI, and CNRS-ROSES are highly appreciated. The usual disclaimer
applies.2   Ian Babetskii
Nontechnical Summary
There is a large debate in economics on the link between economic integration and business cycle
co-movement. According to one viewpoint, closer trade links could lead to business cycle
synchronization or, equivalently, increase the symmetry of shocks (European Commission, 1990).
This argument is often referred to as the “endogeneity hypothesis” of Frankel and Rose (1998).
From the alternative point of view (e.g. Krugman, 1993) the opposite effect should prevail:
international trade increases specialization, making shocks more asymmetric. The overall impact
of trade integration on shock symmetry could thus be ambiguous, at least theoretically. Modern
formal models do not seem to offer a unique answer either.
Focusing on the business cycle criteria of the optimal currency area (OCA), this paper analyzes
the effects of trade integration on synchronization of supply and demand shocks between the
European Union (EU) and ten candidate Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) over
the past decade. Since the trade of the CEECs with the EU has significantly increased over the
transition period, and since several transition countries have pegged their currencies to the
Deutschmark, subsequently replaced by the euro, we face a sort of “natural experiment” for
testing the impact of trade integration on the correlation of shocks.
Our empirical approach contains two steps. First, using the Kalman-filtering estimation technique
in a way advocated by Boone (1997), we obtain the time-varying correlation coefficient of supply
and demand shocks between the CEECs and the EU/Germany as alternative benchmarks. Second,
we assess whether the estimated shock asymmetry can be explained by trade and exchange rate
indicators. The results indicate that higher trade intensity and lower exchange rate volatility
contribute to the convergence of demand shocks, thus supporting the European Commission
(1990) point of view. Therefore, one policy interpretation is that that joining the European
Monetary Union (EMU) would not increase the costs for the candidate countries, in terms of the
costs associated with demand shock asymmetry. On the other hand, given the ambiguous results
for supply shocks and the limitations of the technique, the overall implications should be
mentioned with caution.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   3
Over the long run everything is
endogenous and we are all dead
Flandreau and Maurel (2001), p. 19
1. Introduction
According to recent European Union (EU) decisions at the summits in Brussels and Copenhagen
1,
EU enlargement is scheduled for 1 May 2004. Ten countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – have been invited to
enter the European Union
2. The question of sharing a common monetary policy will then emerge.
Would it be beneficial for the candidate countries to join the European Monetary Union (EMU)
immediately upon entering the EU, or to postpone adoption of the euro for a number of years? A
comprehensive assessment of this challenging issue is beyond the scope of our study. In this paper
we concentrate on some cost aspects of joining the eurozone, namely on the degree of shock
asymmetry between the EU and the candidate countries, with the objective of identifying the
effects of economic integration on synchronization of shocks.
The issue of shock asymmetry has received particular attention due to the development of the
optimal currency area (OCA) theory, which originates in the work of Mundell (1961), McKinnon
(1963) and Kenen (1969). According to the classical OCA criteria, two countries or regions would
benefit from forming a monetary union if they are characterized by high similarity of business
cycles, have strong trade links, and if they possess an efficient adjustment mechanism
3 that can
mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks
4. The first criterion is often considered the key
one. Indeed, if the business cycles of two countries are highly synchronized, or in other words if
countries are exposed to symmetric shocks and exhibit similar responses to these shocks, a
common monetary policy response does not introduce imbalances between them. In other words,
higher symmetry of shocks between countries, inter alia, implies a lower cost of sharing a
common monetary policy. Much interest, therefore, has been focused on estimating the degree of
shock asymmetry between countries or regions. As far as the EU candidate countries are
concerned, empirical studies have only recently begun to appear as longer time series become
available. The still scarce evidence suggests that selected Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) have achieved some synchronization of their business cycles with the EU, at least on the
demand side
5. It is commonly stressed, however, that the period of transition is too short to draw
robust conclusions. For this reason, we re-estimate our previous results (2002 and 2003) focusing
                                          
1 On 18 November and 12–13 December 2002 respectively.
2 The accession of Bulgaria and Romania has been set for 2007.
3 E.g. labor mobility, flexibility of factor prices, and a system of fiscal transfers.
4 There is a tendency in the literature to use the terms “shocks” and “business cycles” as synonyms. However,
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components of macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP, industrial production, employment, etc. Hence, the
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on sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of countries, time span, and identification
approach.
Along with the measurement issue, another question concerns the link between economic
integration and shock asymmetry. It is here where the endogeneity issue arises. The endogeneity
of the OCA criteria is formulated in the sense of the Lucas critique: currency union affects the
underlying OCA criteria in such a way that they are more likely to be satisfied ex post, as both
monetary and trade integration deepen
6. Putting it in practical terms, the endogeneity argument
means that a policy change (e.g. steps towards forming a monetary union) influences shock
asymmetry. There are two opposite views on this subject, classified by De Grauwe (1997) as “The
European Commission View” and the “Krugman View”. According to the European Commission
(1990), closer integration leads to less frequent asymmetric shocks and to more synchronized
business cycles between countries. On the other hand, for Krugman (1993) closer integration
implies higher specialization and, thus, higher risks of idiosyncratic shocks. Drawing on the
evidence from a group of ten transition countries which have experienced an impressive increase
in trade openness and economic integration with the European Union during the past decade, this
paper tries to find out whose argument is supported by the data. Since the trade of the CEECs with
the EU has significantly increased over the transition period, and since several accession countries
have pegged their currencies to the Deutschmark, subsequently replaced by the euro, we face a
sort of natural experiment for testing the endogeneity argument.
Methodologically, we apply a bi-variate vector autoregressive procedure proposed by Blanchard
and Quah (1989), theoretically anchored in the sticky price paradigm for open economies, in order
to identify supply and demand shocks for the candidate countries, with Germany and the
aggregate EU-15 as alternative benchmarks. Then, using the Kalman filtering technique in a way
advocated by Boone (1997), we construct the time-varying correlation of shocks between the
candidate countries and the aggregate EU-15 and Germany as alternative benchmarks. The new
results are in line with our previous estimates (2002 and 2003) and show more clear-cut patterns.
In particular, the results demonstrate that the demand shocks have converged (to levels
comparable to present EU member countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain), while
asymmetries of the supply shocks prevail. Next, we confront the time-varying estimates of supply
and demand shock convergence with indicators of trade and exchange rates. We find that (i) an
increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of demand shocks; the result for supply
shocks is ambiguous; (ii) a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand
shock convergence and no significant impact on supply shocks. The results for demand shocks
can be interpreted in favor of “The European Commission View”, also referred to as the
endogeneity argument by Frankel and Rose (1998) in the OCA criteria discussion, according to
which trade links and monetary integration reduce asymmetries between countries. Overall, our
results support Kenen’s (2001) argument that the impact of trade integration on shock asymmetry
depends on the type of shock.
                                          
6 The term “endogeneity of the OCA criteria” was introduced by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998). See also
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Rose (2000) for a discussion.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   5
The paper is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, the second section presents a
literature review on the subject of shocks and trade integration and illustrates some stylized facts
from the CEECs. The third section describes the data and empirical methodology. The fourth
section starts with an illustration of the methodology for the Czech Republic case and then
presents a comparative analysis for a group of ten transition countries. The last section concludes
and draws policy implications.
2. Shock asymmetry and integration: What do we expect?
2.1 Measuring shock asymmetry
A number of studies focus on measuring the degree of shock asymmetry across countries. In
earlier research, the judgment about shocks was based on cross-country correlation of real output,
industrial production, or real exchange rate cycles
7. Such an approach, however, does not allow
one to distinguish between the shocks themselves and the reactions to them. Since both
components are present in the actual series, similar results in terms of correlation coefficients
might be observed in the presence of various combinations of shocks and responses to shocks, for
example, in the case of a symmetric reaction to asymmetric shocks or an asymmetric reaction to
symmetric shocks.
Blanchard and Quah (1989) propose a bi-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) procedure in order
to separate shocks from responses. Moreover, this method makes it possible to identify the origins
of shocks, for example, supply and demand. Blanchard and Quah (1989) define shocks as linear
combinations of the residuals from a bi-variate VAR representation of real output growth and
inflation. By construction, one type of shock (labeled as “demand”) has only a transitory impact
on the level of output, while another type of shock (labeled as “supply”) might have a long-term
impact on the level of output.
More precisely, if real output and prices are used as inputs to the VAR model, then “demand”
shocks are defined so that they do not have a long-term impact on either output or prices, while
“supply” shocks might have a long-term effect on output. VAR decomposition has become an
especially popular tool in identifying shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993, 1996) to assess the similarities of economic cycles in the case of European monetary
integration. One should, however, be aware of the limitations of the VAR technique. In particular,
the methodology does not distinguish whether the corresponding supply and demand disturbances
are due to domestic or foreign shocks. VAR decomposition is performed on a country-by-country
basis; hence, a country’s fluctuations in output and prices may be affected by domestic as well as
foreign shocks. Of course, it is not likely that, say, Czech shocks affect fluctuations in
macroeconomic fundamentals in Germany or the European Union. However, it seems plausible
that German or EU shocks may affect the CEECs. As will be illustrated in Section 2.3, Germany
and the EU are important, if not the major, trade partners for the accession countries. The results,
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therefore, should be interpreted with care. The same level of shock symmetry between two
countries may correspond to various combinations of foreign and domestic shocks and responses.
Later, co-movements of shocks across countries and regions were used for the assessment of the
OCA criteria. For example, a high correlation between two countries’ series of shocks indicates
that the economic structures of the countries under consideration are quite similar. This
methodology allows Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) to identify the “core” European countries,
for which the cost of a common monetary policy could thus be low.
Note that the shock-series correlation coefficient is a static measure. Therefore, it is difficult to
judge whether shocks become more symmetric or not. However, since the degree of economic
integration changes over time, there are few reasons to believe that shock asymmetry remains
constant. The dynamics can be partially assessed by splitting up the whole period and calculating
the correlation coefficient by sub-periods, provided that the sub-intervals are long enough. There
is, however, a more fundamental critique to this approach. Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999)
argue that “the central critique to be addressed to studies based on VAR estimates of asymmetric
shocks refers to the assumption of structural asymmetries. The only way to relax this assumption
is to use the Kalman filter in order to tackle the issue of a dynamic convergence of shocks
8.”
Boone (1997) applies the Kalman filter technique in order to obtain time-varying estimates of
shock symmetry. Her results for Western European countries are consistent with those reported by
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) and, notably, give rich information about the dynamics of
evolving symmetries. The results are generally interpreted in favor of the endogeneity argument:
the observable increase in supply and demand shock correlation goes along with deepening
European integration.
An increasing number of studies focus on the analysis of symmetries between current European
Union members and accession countries. Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999), Fidrmuc and
Korhonen (2001), Horvath (2002a), Frenkel and Nickel (2002), and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel
(2002) follow the structural VAR identification methodology developed by Blanchard and Quah
(1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996). Supply and demand shocks are extracted from
quarterly series of real output and prices. Short time series (less then ten years of quarterly
observations) complicate the econometric analysis.
Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999) and Horvath (2002a) conclude that correlation of neither
demand nor supply shocks can be interpreted in favor of convergence. Fidrmuc and Korhonen
(2001) find that the cross-country correlation of supply shocks varies substantially from country
to country. Correlation of demand shocks between the EU and the CEECs is substantial for
Hungary and Estonia, while other accession countries show modest results. Compared to the
earlier studies for Western European countries, current results indicate an increase in
synchronization between the EU “core” and Italy and Portugal, previously considered
“peripheral” countries. Frenkel and Nickel (2002) point out that there is high heterogeneity among
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CEECs and EU countries in terms of correlation of supply and demand shocks, and the adjustment
dynamics of output and prices are far from being similar either. However, “the more advanced
CEECs are hardly different in the correlation of their shocks vis-à-vis the euro area and the bigger
EMU countries than the smaller countries of the EU that have already adopted the euro as their
currency”. By the same token, some accession countries show evidence of similarity of impulse
responses with either Germany, France, Italy, or the EU as a whole.
Babetskii, Boone and Maurel (2002, 2003) extend the analysis of supply and demand shocks by
measuring time-varying correlation in a way advocated by Boone (1997). Their results stress an
ongoing process of demand shock convergence between the EU and the accession countries.
Supply shocks tend to diverge, which is interpreted as a due restructuring process at work and the
Balassa–Samuelson effect. Overall, there seems be a problem with the low robustness of the
estimated correlation of supply and demand shocks in different studies, despite the fact that they
use the same (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) methodology. The diversity of the results might be due
to the sensitivity of the correlation coefficient to the VAR specification, data sources, and sample
lengths. For example, Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999) and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel
(2002, 2003) use data on the CEECs from the early 1990s and thus include the “transformational
recession” in the sample. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) and Frenkel and Nickel (2002) use later
data, so the results are believed to be less affected by structural changes. The first objective of the
present paper, therefore, is to assess the robustness of the time-varying correlation of shocks.
The debate has been centered so far on the measurement issue, namely, how to identify shocks
and how to measure cross-country correlation of disturbances. One serious issue has been omitted.
A natural question concerns the determinants and sources of the observable increases or decreases
in shock symmetry. To some extent, all the studies mentioned above try to discuss factors that
drive the cycles’ symmetries or asymmetries. Integration in the various interpretations of this
broad concept is often said to be the key factor that affects the understanding of business cycle co-
movements. Yet such a potentially important explanatory variable is missing from the analysis.
This is the subject to which we now turn.
2.2 Shock asymmetry and integration: Discussing endogeneity
Frankel and Rose (1998) open a large debate on the endogeneity of OCA criteria fulfillment. In
the spirit of the European Commission (1990), Frankel and Rose (1998) put forward an argument
that closer trade links could lead to business cycle synchronization or, equivalently, increase the
symmetry of shocks. According to the alternative viewpoint, e.g. Krugman (1993), the opposite
effect should prevail: international trade increases specialization, making shocks more
asymmetric. The overall impact of trade integration on shock symmetry could thus be ambiguous,
at least theoretically. Modern formal models of optimum currency areas do not seem to offer a
unique answer either
9. Frankel and Rose (1998) stress the necessity of further analysis of the role
of international trade by distinguishing between inter-industry and intra-industry trade. Inter-
industry trade (trade which involves exports and imports of different goods, for example, when
one country exports cotton and imports wines) reflects specialization, thus potentially causing
                                          
9 See Ricci (1997b); see also Horvath (2002b), pp. 21–23, for a recent review of OCA models.8   Ian Babetskii
asymmetries. On the other hand, intra-industry trade (when a country simultaneously exports and
imports products of the same category, e.g. cars) should lead to business cycle co-movements.
There is on-going theoretical work in this direction
10.
The concept of integration can be considered in a broader sense, including monetary integration as
well. Ricci (1997a) builds a two-country model of optimum currency areas which incorporates
monetary and real variables. One of the model’s key implications is that “the adoption of fixed
exchange rates endogenously (i.e. within the model) increases the desirability of this currency
area by reducing the shock asymmetry
11.” Note that in Ricci’s model exchange rates affect shock
asymmetry indirectly, through trade: flexible exchange rates favor specialization compared with
fixed rates. Specialization, in turn, leads to higher asymmetry of shocks. Hence, it follows that
exchange rate arrangements may matter for business cycle correlation, at least to the extent that
specialization leads to asymmetric responses. Naturally, other determinants beside bilateral trade,
its specialization patterns, and exchange rate regimes may influence shock transmission between
countries. One might think about tariffs and non-tariff barriers, institutional agreements, border
effects, etc.
As for empirical evidence, Frankel and Rose (1998) in their influential work argue that “countries
with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles”. Econometrically,
Frankel and Rose assess the following relationship between trade intensity and correlation of
business cycles:
t ij t ij t j i TI c c Q Q Corr ε + + = ) log( ) , ( 2 1
where the bars denote period-averaged values of trade intensity  ) log( ijt TI  and of the correlation
of business cycles  ) , ( jt it Q Q Corr
12. The business cycle  it Q  in country i at time t is defined as the
detrended component of real economic activity (e.g. GDP, index of industrial production, total
employment or unemployment). The trade intensity between countries i and j is calculated from
exports, imports or total bilateral trade according to the following expressions (natural logarithms
of):
) /( jt it ijt
EX
ijt EX EX EX TI + =
) /( jt it ijt
IM
ijt IM IM IM TI + =
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =
where  ijt EX  are exports from country i to country j,  it EX  are total exports from country i, and IM
denotes imports. The estimates are performed on a large cross-section of OECD countries over
thirty years, and the results seems be very robust as to the choice of indicators of bilateral trade
and business cycles. Total trade is further confronted with intra-industry trade. Although not
                                          
10 See, among others, Kose and Yi (2001).
11 “Endogenously” means “within the model”.
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directly tested, it is the latter that is said to be particularly relevant for business cycle convergence.
Additional inclusion of the exchange rate regime dummy does not qualitatively change the results.
At least one important question remains, however, after reading this article: are underlying shocks
becoming more symmetric as well? All the constructed indicators of business cycles belong to the
same class. Namely, they represent detrended indicators of economic activity. Hence, shocks and
responses to shocks enter the analysis together. Kenen (2001, p. 15) argues that the results of
Frankel and Rose (1998) are biased, since trade, a real variable, is not exogenous to fluctuations
of another real variable such as economic activity. Kenen (2001) sketches a simple Keynesian
framework where the correlation of output changes between two countries is positively related to
bilateral trade intensity, not necessarily due to higher symmetry of shocks. Generally, the impact
of trade integration on shock asymmetry depends on the type of shock.
Fidrmuc (2001) re-estimates the specification of Frankel and Rose (1998), focusing on a cross-
section of OECD countries over the last ten years and working with different frequencies
(quarterly data). Aware of Kenen’s (2001) criticism, Fidrmuc (2001) reconfirms the interpretation
by Frankel and Rose (1998) and bypasses Kenen’s criticism. This is done by direct inclusion of
intra-industry trade in the regression. Thus, according to the main point of Fidrmuc (2001), it is
the particular structure of trade that matters for business cycle transmission.
Using disaggregated trade data, Fontagne and Freudenberg (1999) find evidence that exchange
rate variability depresses intra-industry trade, and consequently, as they argue, should lead to a
higher symmetry of shocks. Based on historical data, Flandreau and Maurel (2001) argue that
there is a positive impact of both monetary arrangements and trade on business cycle correlation.
This analysis of the literature is far from being complete
13. However, looking at these and other
studies not discussed here, one can note a surprising segmentation in research interests. Two
entirely separate classes of studies seem to co-exist: those focusing on measuring correlation of
shocks, and others concentrating on assessing the link between business cycle fluctuations and
trade, the exchange rate and other explanatory variables. More specifically, studies of the first
group illustrate static or dynamic patterns of shock correlation, stressing the importance of
distinguishing between shocks and responses to shocks. Studies of the second group identify the
effects of trade and other variables on various business cycle indicators containing both shocks
and responses to shocks. To our knowledge, there are no direct estimates of the effects of
integration on shock asymmetry.
In our work we will try to build a bridge between these two groups of studies by confronting time-
varying estimates of shock asymmetry with trade and exchange rate variables. Bringing the two
classes of studies together gives us a tool for assessing the long-running debate between the
proponents of “The European Commission View” and those of “The Krugman View”. Before
proceeding with the estimates, the following sub-section will briefly clarify our choice of
countries.
                                          
13 There are studies on estimations of the “OCA indices” which infer the readiness of countries to join a
monetary union by predicting exchange rate variability. See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) and Horváth and
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2.3 Some stylized facts from the candidate countries
In this study we focus on the candidate countries, since they represent a kind of “natural
experiment” for testing the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory. Indeed, the past decade has
been characterized by an increase in the trade openness of the CEECs and their trade and
monetary integration with EU member countries. These three factors together, briefly illustrated
below, may affect the degree of business cycle co-movement.
In 2001, the ratios of total bilateral trade to GDP represented more than one hundred percent of
GDP for eight of the CEECs from our sample. In the remaining two “big” candidate countries,
Poland (population 39 million) and Romania (22 million), trade accounted for 63% and 75% of
GDP respectively (see Table 1). Compared to 1993, there has been a significant increase in trade
openness for the majority of the candidate countries. The two exceptions are Latvia and Lithuania,
but these countries had already achieved high shares of trade in GDP during the earlier transition
period.







1993 2001 1993 2001 1993 2001
Bulgaria 84 119 1,190 1,603 8.5 7.9
Czech Republic 109 145 3,391 5,551 10.3 10.3
Estonia 144 188 985 3,830 1.5 1.4
Hungary 61 123 3,790 5,215 10.3 9.9
Latvia 130 103 813 3,275 2.6 2.4
Lithuania 173 106 719 3,245 3.7 3.5
Poland 45 63 2,229 4,561 38.5 38.6
Romania 51 75 1,157 1,768 22.8 22.4
Slovak Republic 122 157 2,489 3,794 5.3 5.4
Slovenia 116 121 6,368 10,605 2.0 2.0
CEECs average 103 120 2,313 4,345 10.5 10.4
Germany 45 68 24,120 22,530 81.2 82.4
United States 21 24 25,742 35,367 258.1 284.8
Sources:   Trade and population: IMF International Financial Statistics, author’s computations;
GDP per capita: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.
Table 2 illustrates the shares of trade with the EU and Germany in the total trade of the CEECs. In
2001, the bilateral trade of the CEECs with the European Union varied from roughly 50% of total
trade for Lithuania to 70% of total trade for the Czech Republic. For comparison, this is on
average higher than the share of the trade of Germany with other EU member countries (54%).
Germany itself is an important trade partner for the majority of the CEECs, accounting in 2001 for
20–40 percent of total bilateral trade for half of the accession countries. Overall, we observe an
important increase in trade with the European Union and Germany.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   11
Table 2: Shares of trade with the EU and Germany in total trade of the CEECs
(ordered by decreasing shares of trade with the EU in 2001)
Country European Union Germany
1993 2001 1993 2001
Czech Republic 0.52 0.69 0.27 0.38
Poland 0.67 0.68 0.32 0.31
Hungary 0.56 0.66 0.23 0.31
Slovenia 0.62 0.65 0.26 0.23
Romania 0.44 0.64 0.15 0.18
Latvia 0.30 0.55 0.08 0.16
Estonia 0.55 0.55 0.09 0.07
Slovak Republic 0.29 0.54 0.13 0.27








Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, author’s computations.
Bilateral trade intensity is another indicator which serves to characterize the extent of trade
between countries. Figure 1 shows the total bilateral trade intensity between ten transition
countries and EU / Germany over 1993–2001, quarterly. Except for Bulgaria and Slovenia,
bilateral trade intensity exhibits upward trend patterns with respect to either Germany or the EU.
In the case of Slovenia, bilateral trade intensity has been relatively high since the early 1990s and
this indicator has remained practically unchanged over the past decade. For Bulgaria, trade
intensity has had a rising tendency since 1997.
Along with trade openness and trade integration, substantial convergence of exchange rates with
the euro has been visible. As illustrated in Table 3, in many cases the candidate countries peg their
currencies to the DEM (replaced by the euro at the beginning of 1999). Other monetary authorities
(e.g. in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and recently also in Hungary and Poland), who formally
follow a free float policy, use the euro as the reference currency in formulating their preferred
exchange rate developments. Thus, the actual exchange rate regimes in these countries can be
characterized as a managed float with euro-based intervention levels. The actual volatility of
exchange rates under this kind of policy has been decreasing over time (Table 4).12   Ian Babetskii
Figure 1: Total bilateral trade intensity, 1993–2001
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Total bilateral trade intensity is defined according to the following formula (natural logarithm of):
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU,  ijt EX  = exports from country i to country j,  it EX  = total exports
from country i, and IM denotes imports.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, author’s computations.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   13
Table 3: Exchange rate regimes in the CEECs over the last decade






Bulgaria February 1991 Managed Float
1 July 1997 Currency Board DEM 0%
1 January 1999 Currency Board euro 0%
Czech Republic 3 May 1993 Peg DEM(65%), USD(35%) ±0.5%
28 February 1996 Peg DEM(65%), USD(35%) ±7.5%
26 May 1997 Managed Float Reference currency DEM
replaced in 1999 by euro
Estonia June 1992 Currency Board DEM 0%
1 January 1999 Currency Board euro 0%
Hungary 22 December 1994 Crawling Band ECU(70%), USD(30%) ±2.25%
1 January 1997 Crawling Band DEM(70%), USD(30%) ±2.25%
1 January 1999 Crawling Band euro(70%), USD(30%) ±2.25%
1 January 2000 Crawling Band euro ±2.25%
4 May 2001 Crawling Band euro ±15%
Latvia February 1994 Peg SDR ±1%
Lithuania October 1992 Independent Float
April 1994 Currency Board USD 0%
1 February 2002 Currency Board euro 0%
Poland 16 May 1995 Crawling Band USD(45%), DEM(35%),
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%)
±7%
26 February 1998 Crawling Peg USD(45%), DEM(35%),
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%)
±10%
28 October 1998 Crawling Peg USD(45%), DEM(35%),
BP(10%), FF(5%), SwF(5%)
±12.5%
1 January 1999 Crawling Peg euro(55%), USD(45%) ±12.5%
25 March 1999 Crawling Peg euro(55%), USD(45%) ±15%
12 April 2000 Independent Float
Romania August 1992 Managed Float
Slovak Republic 14 July 1994 Peg DEM(60%), USD(40%) ±7%
1 January 1996 Peg DEM(60%), USD(40%) ± 3%
31 July 1996 Peg DEM(60%), USD(40%) ± 5%
1 January 1997 Peg DEM(60%), USD(40%) ± 7%
2 October 1998 Managed Float Reference currency euro
since 1999
Slovenia January 1992 Managed Float
Sources:  Valachy and Kočenda (2003), Schoors (2001), Halpern and Wyplosz  (2001) and Central
Europe Weekly (2001, January 18).14   Ian Babetskii
Table 4: Volatility of nominal exchange rates
1 (%)
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Bulgaria n.a. 24.5 5.5 39.7 20.1 77.0 85.6 15.2 0.4 0.0 0.0
Czech Rep. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.4 1.2 1.0 4.4 4.3 2.9 2.6 2.8
Hungary 8.0 6.2 4.4 9.6 16.0 10.3 5.8 7.9 4.3 1.8 2.3
Poland 6.9 17.3 12.6 14.5 9.5 4.9 5.7 4.7 5.4 3.7 5.6
Romania 94.7 77.5 48.5 41.7 19.2 22.1 36.9 14.8 26.7 13.2 14.8
Slovakia n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.9 1.6 0.9 1.5 3.9 6.7 2.8 1.6
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 14.4 8.4 2.1 5.6 3.2 2.0 2.4 3.5 3.4
Estonia n.a. n.a. 2.1 0.8 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.0
Latvia n.a. n.a. 17.1 13.8 2.5 1.3 3.4 2.0 3.8 6.4 2.6
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.5 6.4 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6
CEECs average 36.5 31.4 14.9 14.4 8.0 12.7 15.4 5.9 5.8 4.3 3.9
USA 5.8 5.8 6.5 3.7 5.9 2.4 6.1 3.4 4.4 8.6 4.6
Note:
 1 Standard deviations in percent from average nominal exchange rates against ECU/euro over
preceding two years.
Source: Author’s computations based on the IMF International Financial Statistics (2002), monthly
averages
Figure 2 and Table 5 show convergence of GDP-deflator-based inflation rates. Not only have
inflation levels decreased, but so has the variability of inflation rates across the CEECs.
Figure 2: Inflation
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Std.dev.
CEECs average quarterly inflation rates
(excluding Bulgaria and Romania)
Variability of quarterly inflation rates across
CEECs (excl. Bulgaria and Romania)
Note: 
1GDP-deflator based.
Source: Author’s calculations.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   15
Table 5: Inflation
1 convergence across the CEECs
1994–1998 1999–2002
CEECs average 6.3 2.0
           CEECs: sigma-convergence 7.7 2.6
CEECs average. (excl. Bulgaria and Romania) 3.6 1.2
           CEECs (excl. Bulgaria and Romania): sigma-
convergence
2.4 1.3
Germany average 0.3 0.2
EU-15 average 0.5 0.5




3. Data and methodology
This section starts with a description of the data set, followed by the empirical methodology,
which contains three main procedures: (i) identifying supply and demand disturbances, (ii)
constructing time-varying correlation of shocks, and (iii) confronting shock asymmetry with
indicators of trade and exchange rate volatility. The last part of the section describes econometric
specifications for illustrating the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory.
The sample covers ten accession countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia), plus Germany, the EU-15
aggregate, the United States, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
The series of real output (GDP at 1995 prices, in billions of national currency), prices (GDP
deflator, rebated to 100 for 1995), and exports and imports (in millions of current US dollars) are
quarterly, ranging from 1990:Q1 to 2002:Q2.
The following sources are used: OECD Analytical Database, IMF International Financial
Statistics, EIU Country Data, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, and National Statistical
Committees. The OECD is the main source for the series of real output and prices. These data are
available in seasonally adjusted form. The remaining output and price series were deseasonalized
by applying the U.S. Census Bureau’s X11 procedure, the same method as used by the OECD
14.
Data for some accession countries are unavailable prior to 1994. The trade data cover the period
up to 2001:Q4.
3.1 Step 1: Identification of shocks
In the first step, we decompose the fluctuations in the macroeconomic aggregates into shocks and
responses to shocks. There is no unique identification strategy. We choose a bi-variate structural
VAR method proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) in their influential American Economic
                                          
14 X11 is a sort of moving-average filtering procedure with time-evolving seasonal factors.16   Ian Babetskii
Review paper, in the way that Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) apply this decomposition to
extract supply and demand shocks from quarterly series of real output and prices. As discussed in
section 2.2, such an approach is quite popular in studies of business cycle convergence for
developed countries, and there is recent evidence for accession countries as well.
The identification strategy is based on a stylized representation of the economy described by
aggregate supply and demand curves. The aggregate demand (AD) curve is negatively sloped in
both the short run and the long run, meaning that lower prices increase demanded output. The
aggregate supply curve is upward-sloping in the short-run and vertical in the long-run. A
positively sloped short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) reflects the existence of nominal rigidities,
therefore a nominal variable (prices) has a temporary effect on the real variable (output). Finally,
a vertical long-run aggregate supply (LRAS) curve implies full-capacity use of the production
factors.
Shocks in this simple model correspond to shifts in the aggregate supply and demand curves away
from equilibrium. Supply shocks, which are associated with a shift in the aggregate supply curve,
have both short-term and long-term impacts on both output and prices. Demand shocks also have
short term effects on both variables. However, since the long-term supply curve is vertical,
demand shocks do not have a long-term effect on the level of output. A structural bi-variate VAR
decomposition makes it possible to identify supply and demand shocks from the observable
movements of output and prices.
Formally, consider stationary variables  t y  and  t p , for example, the first differences of
logarithmic GDP and logarithmic prices: 1 log log − − = t t t GDP GDP y  and  1 log log − − = t t t P P p .
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where 
y
t e  and 
p
t e  are white-noise disturbances,  ijk b are coefficients, and K is the lag length chosen
so that 
y
t e  and 
p
t e  are serially uncorrelated
15. Disturbances 
y
t e  and 
p
t e  are not structural, they
simply represent unexplained components in output growth and inflation movements. In order to
recover structural disturbances, i.e. those having an economic interpretation of supply and demand
shocks, the following two relationships are proposed:
                                          
15 We select K in two ways. First, following Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Babetskii, Boone and Maurel
(2002, 2003) we use eight lags, which is equivalent to two years, and perform estimates starting from 1990.
Alternatively, we focus on the period since 1993 in order to minimize the impact of “transformational recession”
and apply the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria, which suggest two, three or four lags. We set uniformly
two and four lags. Finally, we perform diagnostic checking of the residuals for higher-order serial correlation
(Ljung-Box test) and normality (Jarque-Bera test). Comparison between the estimates allows us to assess












t c c e ε ε 22 21 + =  (4)
where 
D
t ε and 
S
t ε are demand and supply disturbances respectively. These equations state that the
unexplainable components in the movements of output growth and inflation are linear
combinations of supply and demand shocks. In matrix form,  t t C e ε = . The vector of the
structural disturbances  t ε can be obtained by inverting matrix C:  t t e C
1 − = ε .
In order to recover the four coefficients of matrix C, four restrictions have to be imposed.
Knowledge of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated disturbances 
D
t ε  and 
S
t ε  is












p e Var c c = +  (6)
) , ( 22 12 21 11
p y e e Cov c c c c = +  (7)
These restrictions on the coefficients of matrix C are directly derived from eq. (3) and eq. (4)
using normalization conditions:
(i) the variance of demand and supply shocks is unity: 1 ) ( ) ( = =
S D Var Var ε ε
(ii) demand and supply shocks are orthogonal:  0 ) , ( =
S D Cov ε ε
The fourth restriction on coefficients  ij c is that demand shocks 
D
t ε  have no long-term impact on
the level of output. To put this restriction into a mathematical form, one should substitute
equations (3) and (4) into the VAR system given by eq. (1) and eq. (2), and then express variables







































k t k t c c c p ε ε    (9)
System (8)–(9) is an infinite moving-average representation of the VAR form (1)–(2).
Coefficients  ijk c  – called impulse response functions – characterize the effect of structural
disturbances on the left-hand-side variables after k periods ( ijk c  can be expressed in terms of the
four coefficients of interest  ij c  and the estimated coefficients  ij b , but the algebra is messy). The
restriction that the cumulative effect of demand disturbances on output growth is zero, for all







k c . This restriction also implies
that demand disturbances have no long-term impact on the level of output itself. Indeed,  k c1118   Ian Babetskii
represents the effect of the demand disturbance 
D
k t− ε on  1 log log − − = t t t GDP GDP y , output
growth after k periods. Therefore, the sequence  110 c , 111 c , 112 c ,…, 1 11 − k c , k c11  represents the effect
of 
D
k t− ε  on
) log (log 1 − − t t GDP GDP , ) log (log 1 t t GDP GDP − + , ) log (log 1 2 + + − t t GDP GDP ,…,







k c states that the effect of  t D, ε  on  ) log (log 1 N t t GDP GDP + − − equals zero, i.e. that the
level of output does not change in the long run: N t t GDP GDP + − = log log 1 . It can furthermore be







k c  translates into the parameters of interest  ij c and the
coefficients  ) (k bij of the unrestricted VAR system (1)–(2) as:






















k b c k b c  (10)
Restrictions (5), (6), (7), (10) serve to identify four coefficients  ij c  which, in turn, are used to
recover the supply and demand disturbances from the VAR residuals by inverting matrix C:
t t e C
1 − = ε .
3.2 Step 2: Calculating “time-varying correlation” of supply and demand disturbances
Following Boone (1997) we use the Kalman filter to compute the “time-varying correlation
























t v b b + = −1  (12b)
where X are the supply or demand shocks, error terms µ  and vare white noise disturbances,
index i denotes an accession country, j stands for Germany or the EU, and k is the United States.
Equation (11) is called the measurement or observation equation. Coefficients 
ijk
t a  and 
ijk
t b
(denoted as  t a  and  t b  henceforth in order to facilitate reading) are allowed to vary in time
according to (12a) and (12b), which are called transition or state equations.
The intuition behind this specification is simple. For example, in the presence of perfect
correlation of shocks between countries i and j, coefficients  t a  and  t b  both go to zero. The right-
hand side of (11) being equal to zero implies that  i
t X  – shocks for an accession country i – are
thus explained by 
j
t X  – shocks for a reference country j (Germany or the European Union). If  t b
diverge from zero, then the United States has a stronger effect on country i shocks than the
reference country j. The United States is used as a benchmark since it is the major trade partner
for the EU and an important trade partner for the CEECs. For a convergence process to be at
work, we expect  t a  to be close to zero and  t b  to decrease over time.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   19
Technically, the Kalman filter represents a recursive algorithm for computing the optimal
estimator of unknown parameters  t a  and  t b . This is done by maximizing a likelihood function
given the information available at time t. The estimator is optimal in the sense that it minimizes
the mean square error (MSE). Furthermore, if all disturbances are normal, the Kalman filter
provides the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of  t a  and  t b . Details on the Kalman filter
estimations of the representation (11)–(12) are available in Annex A in Boone (1997). For more
information, see Harvey (1992).
The main advantage of the method in hand is that it gives optimal estimations of the time-varying
coefficients in the presence of structural changes, which is the case with the accession countries.
As a drawback, the Kalman filter does not explain why the coefficients change over time; the
filter simply draws the time path of the model’s parameters. It is the objective of the next sub-
section to confront the dynamics of coefficient  t b  – an indicator of shock asymmetry – with such
potentially important variables as indicators of bilateral trade intensity.
3.3 Step 3: Shock asymmetry and integration – “The European Commission View”
versus “The Krugman View”
The endogeneity argument implies that trade integration affects shock asymmetry. The sign of this
effect is either positive or negative depending on which view – that of the European Commission
(1990) or that of Krugman (1993) – is believed to be true. Basically, we need to determine
whether there is a link between the indicators of shock asymmetry and integration. Thanks to the
use of the Kalman filter, we are able to determine the degree of shock asymmetry at quarterly
frequency. Indicators of trade intensity are available on a quarterly basis as well. Hence, as a
starting point, we look at the correlation between the time-varying coefficients of shock
asymmetry  t j i b ) , ( ˆ , estimated from (11), and the actual trade intensity  t j i TI ) , ( :
) ) , ( , ) , ( ˆ ( ) , ( t t j i TI j i b Corr j i = ρ  (13)
where i denotes accession country and j stands for Germany or the EU. To perform sensitivity
checking, the correlation coefficient  ) , ( j i ρ  is calculated for two types of shocks (supply and
demand) and three indicators of trade intensity (with respect to exports, imports, and total bilateral
trade). A positive correlation coefficient ) , ( j i ρ  would be in accordance with “The Krugman
View” (higher trade intensity goes along with higher shock asymmetry), while a negative
correlation would support “The European Commission View”.
The correlation coefficient, however, does not indicate the direction of causality. Although the
endogeneity argument states that trade integration affects shock asymmetry, in either a positive or
negative way, the causality can go in the reverse direction, too. For example, a recession in one
country (a negative real shock) usually decreases the demand for imported products, thus lowering
the volume of imports. In our group of ten transition countries it seems possible to separate or at
least to minimize the impact of shocks on trade given the explicit increase in trade integration
over the past decade observable in all countries except Bulgaria and Slovenia (see Figure 1). This
long-term increase in trade integration between the CEECs and the EU/Germany, driven by
structural factors, is not likely to have been caused by shocks. (Yet in the short term, e.g. over the
horizon up to several quarters, aggregate shocks might affect trade intensity.) Therefore, we20   Ian Babetskii
assume that trade intensity is exogenous to shock asymmetry in terms of the long-run relationship.
As an alternative to the simple correlation coefficient, we model the relationship between these
two variables in a regression framework:
t t t j i j i TI c c j i b ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ˆ
2 1 ε + + =      (14)
For a given pair of countries i and j, the error term  t j i ) , ( ε  depends on time only. Here another
difficulty arises. Note that shock asymmetry  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  is not an observable variable such as trade
intensity  t j i TI ) , (  but a product of estimation. Strictly speaking, the distribution of  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  is
unknown and the inclusion of  t j i b ) , ( ˆ  in further regression might be inappropriate; the residuals
t j i ) , ( ε  are, generally, heteroskedastic and autocorrelated. Therefore, at the very limit, one can
stop at calculating the correlation between shock asymmetry and trade intensity. Another option is
to treat shock asymmetry as a classical variable, in the spirit of Frankel and Rose (1998), who link
fluctuations in real economic activity to trade intensity and other explanatory variables.
Additional insight into the link between trade intensity and shock asymmetry can be obtained
from estimating (14) in a panel framework. For a given benchmark country j (the EU or
Germany), and a group of candidate countries i (i=Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, etc), we
estimate the following equation (fixed effects):
it i i it i it j D c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( 3 2 1 ε + + + =

(15)
where  i D  are country dummies. Due to the unknown distribution of b ˆ , the residual terms, again,
are not expected to exhibit the conventional properties. The reason for estimating equation (15) is,
nevertheless, to check whether the relationship between trade intensity and shock asymmetry can
be described by a common slope plus country-specific effects.
Further sensitivity analysis can be done by including the exchange rate variable in the right-hand
side of (15). In fact, according to the theoretical model of Ricci (1997a), exchange rate pegs can
transmit shocks from one country to another. We check, therefore, whether the coefficient of trade
intensity is affected by augmenting eq. (15) with the exchange rate variable:
it i i it it i it j D c ERV c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( ˆ
4 3 2 1 ε + + + + = (16)
where  it ERV  is the exchange rate volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the nominal
exchange rate in candidate country i  against the euro over the past 12 months.  it ERV  is chosen as
a proxy for exchange rate pegs to the euro
16.
                                          
16 This measure artificially increases volatility when a country operates under a crawling peg: changes in the
crawl are interpreted as volatility.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   21
Equation (16) implies that exchange rate volatility is exogenous to shock asymmetry: lower
volatility is expected to reduce shock asymmetry. The causality, however, may go in the opposite
direction. For example, if two countries have similar production structures, which increases the
probability of common shocks, then the cost of fixing the exchange rate may be lower compared
to countries with very different economies. Shock asymmetry can, therefore, influence the choice
of appropriate exchange rate regime. Hence, inclusion of the exchange rate variable as exogenous
can potentially bias the results.
To justify the inclusion of exchange rate volatility in eq. (16), we perform Granger causality tests
for exchange rate volatility and shock asymmetry to determine which variable, if any, is
exogenous. There is no strong support for causality in any of the directions. On the other hand, we
have good reasons to believe that using the DEM, and later the euro, as the reference currency in
the EU candidate countries is driven by other (e.g. political) factors rather than the level of
symmetry of shocks.
Besides, exchange rates can affect shock asymmetry indirectly, via trade: fixing an exchange rate
tends to stimulate trade; trade links, in turn, can make shocks more symmetric. If the effect of
exchange rates on trade is strong, then the inclusion of the exogenous exchange rate variable
might cause a multicollinearity problem, altering the coefficient of trade intensity  2 c  or making it
insignificant. One more reason for including the exchange rate volatility variable is, therefore, to
assess whether it has an effect on trade intensity.
So, in order to assess the robustness of the endogeneity argument of the OCA theory we have at
our disposal (i) two types of shocks, (ii) three indicators of trade intensity with respect to two
benchmarks (the EU and Germany), and (iii) four empirical specifications (the correlation
coefficient (13), time series (14), and panel frameworks (15) and (16)).
4. Results
This section begins with an illustration of the methodology in the Czech Republic case. Using
demand shocks as an example, time-varying estimates of shock convergence are derived and then
confronted with indicators of bilateral trade intensity. The second part covers supply and demand
shocks and their determinants for a large group of EU candidate countries. Sensitivity analysis is
performed by considering several estimates of shock asymmetry and indicators of trade
intensity
17.
4.1 The Czech Republic case, demand shocks
Figures 3a) and 3b) plot Czech demand shocks compared to German and EU demand shocks
respectively.
                                          
17 Due to space limitations, and to preserve clarity, we report results for the case of supply and demand shocks
recovered from the eight-lag VAR system over 1990–2002. Besides, it is for this case that time-varying patterns
of supply and demand shock asymmetries between the CEECs and the EU are illustrated in our recent paper
(2003). The results based on the estimates over 1993–2002, using two or four lags, do not differ qualitatively and
are available upon request.22   Ian Babetskii























































































































One can see some similarities between the Czech and the EU/German patterns of demand shocks,
at least over certain periods. For example, around the beginning of 1997 there is a noticeable
negative demand shock observed in the Czech Republic, Germany and the EU. The next question
is to quantify the degree of similarity of the shock series co-movements.
Kalman Filter estimates help to draw the “time-varying correlation coefficient” of shock series
between the Czech Republic on the one hand and Germany/the EU on the other hand. Estimates
of  t a  and  t b  from (11) over 1994:Q1–2002:Q2 suggest that Czech demand shocks converge to
the corresponding German and EU shocks: coefficients  t a  decline towards zero, indicating that
there is no “autonomous” convergence, and coefficients  t b  decrease, meaning that the
dissimilarities between the Czech and German/EU shock series diminish over time.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   23
Figure 4: Czech Republic, convergence of demand shocks
Convergence to Germany as opposed to the US
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Source: Author’s computations.
Note that since eq. (11) is specified in differences, the values of  t b  characterize the relative
importance of EU/German shocks versus American ones in explaining the Czech shock series. In
the case of convergence to Germany, for example,  t b  close to zero indicates that Czech shocks
are more similar to German than to US shocks. Intuitively, the average value of  t b  over 1996–
1997 (0.3) approximately corresponds to the weights of the German and US currencies in the
basket for the Czech crown (65% DEM and 35% USD) over the same period.
Next, we confront the indicators of shock asymmetry and trade intensity. Figure 5 illustrates a
scatter plot of coefficients  t b  (horizontal axis) versus total bilateral trade intensity (in logarithms;
vertical axis).
There is a strong negative relationship between the asymmetry of demand shocks and trade
intensity with Germany, captured by a high correlation coefficient (-0.81) or, alternatively, by a
significant slope from an OLS regression (-0.46). Almost identical similar results hold for the
Czech–EU case. These results can be interpreted in favor of the argument that trade intensity
reduces demand shock asymmetry.24   Ian Babetskii
Figure 5: Czech Republic case, link between trade intensity and demand shock asymmetry,
1994–2001, quarterly
Czech Republic versus Germany Czech Republic versus EU




































Correlation between shock asymmetry and trade intensity
81 . 0 _ − = GE CZ ρ 81 . 0 _ − = EU CZ ρ
OLS regression of shock asymmetry on trade intensity
(Standard errors in parentheses)
D
t b  = – 1.56 – 0.46 TI
D
t b  = – 1.66 – 0.44 TI
            (0.23)   (0.06)             (0.30)   (0.06)
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Source: Author’s computations.
4.2 Asymmetry of shocks, trade intensity, and exchange rate volatility
Table 6 reports average values of shock asymmetry over 1994–2002 and two sub-periods. The
decreasing averages and variance of the time-varying coefficients  t b  from eq. (11) mean that the
asymmetry of the underlying shocks diminishes
18. The results can be interpreted in favor of
demand shock convergence, while the pattern of the supply shocks (Table 6b) is rather diverging.
Note that the average values of the supply and demand shock asymmetries for the CEECs do not
differ much from the corresponding levels for such EU member countries as Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain
19.
                                          
18 It is also verified that the constant term  t a  converges to zero for both supply and demand shocks. Results are
available upon request.
19 There is a question of whether these selected EU countries represent a good benchmark. On the one hand, they
already share a common monetary policy. On the other hand, the chosen three countries due to their geographical
location are said to belong to the EU “periphery”. In the long term, the CEECs may be more correlated with
Germany/the EU than the “peripheral” countries.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   25
Table 6: Shock asymmetry, 1994–2002
1  (Standard deviations in parentheses)
(a) Demand shocks
Germany European Union
1994–2002 94–98 99–02 1994–2002 94–98 99–02
Czech Republic 0.34 0.39 0.27 0.49 0.54 0.43
(0.13) (0.16) (0.04) (0.11) (0.13) (0.03)
Estonia 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.29
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02)
Hungary 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.35 0.37 0.32
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Latvia 0.44 0.49 0.37 0.35 0.45 0.22
(0.11) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.14) (0.07)
Poland 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.32
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.19) (0.12) (0.08)
Romania 0.72 0.84 0.54 0.89 0.93 0.82
(0.35) (0.39) (0.16) (0.42) (0.39) (0.47)
Slovakia 0.60 0.68 0.52 0.59 0.64 0.53
(0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02)
Slovenia 0.58 0.64 0.53 0.78 0.83 0.71
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08)
CEECs average 0.52 0.57 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.46
Ireland 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.45
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Portugal 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.35 0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Spain 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.49 0.49 0.49
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(b) Supply shocks
Germany European Union
1994–2002 94–98 99–02 1994–2002 94–98 99–02
Czech Republic 0.29 0.08 0.51 0.01 -0.22 0.26
(0.30) (0.26) (0.15) (0.28) (0.15) (0.16)
Estonia 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.68
(0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.20) (0.26) (0.11)
Hungary 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.43 0.30
(0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09)
Latvia 0.75 0.86 0.66 0.34 0.26 0.48
(0.17) (0.19) (0.07) (0.14) (0.10) (0.07)
Poland 0.09 0.07 0.13 -0.02 -0.20 0.23
(0.11) (0.12) (0.07) (0.26) (0.13) (0.16)
Romania 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.25
(0.11) (0.14) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10)
Slovakia 0.72 1.00 0.47 0.30 0.10 0.52
(0.43) (0.48) (0.11) (0.28) (0.24) (0.06)
Slovenia 0.58 0.70 0.47 0.55 0.72 0.37
(0.16) (0.15) (0.07) (0.37) (0.45) (0.12)
CEECs average 0.48 0.51 0.45 0.30 0.24 0.39
Ireland 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Portugal 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.46
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Spain 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note:
 1 Shock asymmetry between CEECs and Germany (EU) is measured by coefficient  t b  from Eq.
(11 ). Lower coefficients mean higher symmetry. Values in boldface denote diminishing
asymmetry of shocks.
Source: Author’s computations.26   Ian Babetskii
Table 7: Correlation between shock asymmetry and trade integration, 1994–2001
)) log( , ( ijt ijt ij TI b Corr = ρ
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU, t = quarter
for two types of shocks
1 and three indicators of trade intensity
2
(a) Demand shocks
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Germany Germany Germany EU EU EU
Czech Republic -0.81 -0.84 -0.76 -0.81 -0.84 -0.74
Estonia 0.32 0.13 0.35 -0.92 -0.86 -0.85
Hungary -0.73 -0.71 -0.72 -0.70 -0.72 -0.66
Latvia -0.57 -0.58 -0.54 -0.90 -0.86 -0.88
Poland -0.46 -0.31 -0.47 -0.76 -0.75 -0.72
Romania -0.10 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.10
Slovakia -0.83 -0.76 -0.84 -0.82 -0.79 -0.81
CEECs average -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 -0.71 -0.70 -0.68
(b) Supply shocks
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Germany Germany Germany EU EU EU
Czech Republic 0.36 0.40 0.30 0.80 0.77 0.76
Estonia 0.56 0.29 0.58 -0.55 -0.44 -0.60
Hungary 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.74 -0.75 -0.71
Latvia -0.77 -0.80 -0.70 0.63 0.68 0.56
Poland 0.30 0.09 0.38 0.67 0.77 0.58
Romania -0.29 -0.32 -0.24 0.58 0.60 0.52
Slovakia -0.93 -0.86 -0.95 0.51 0.65 0.35
CEECs average -0.11 -0.17 -0.09 0.27 0.33 0.21
1Supply or demand shock asymmetry between CEECs and Germany (EU) is measured by coefficient
t b from Eq. (11).
2Trade intensity is defined with respect to exports, imports, and total bilateral trade according to the
following expressions (natural logarithms of):
) /( jt it ijt
EX
ijt EX EX EX TI + =
) /( jt it ijt
IM
ijt IM IM IM TI + =
) /( ) ( jt it jt it ijt ijt
T
ijt IM IM EX EX IM EX TI + + + + =
where i = CEECs, j = Germany/EU,  ijt EX  = exports from country i to country j,  it EX  = total exports
from country i, and IM denotes imports.
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Table 8: Effect of trade intensity and exchange rate volatility on shock asymmetry
1
(standard errors in parentheses)
a)  Demand shocks
Germany
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Trade intensity -0.33 -0.34 -0.30 -0.31 -0.32 -0.29
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Exch. rate volatility – – – 4.84 4.55 4.94
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Number of obs. 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-sq. 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.59 0.59 0.57
S.E. of regression 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14
EU
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Trade intensity -0.27 -0.27 -0.25 -0.28 -0.26 0.30
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Exch. rate volatility – – – 5.17 4.83 5.34
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Number of obs. 204 204 204 204 204 204
Adjusted R-sq. 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.55
S.E. of regression 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.20
b) Supply shocks
Germany
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Trade intensity 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Exch. rate volatility – – – -1.58 -1.36 -1.61
(2.24) (2.04) (2.51)
Number of obs. 196 196 196 196 196 196
Adjusted R-sq. 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65
S.E. of regression 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
EU
Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports
Trade intensity 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.16
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Exch. rate volatility – – – 1.48 1.71 1.58
(2.30) (2.30) (2.30)
Number of obs. 196 196 196 196 196 196
Adjusted R-sq. 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.56
S.E. of regression 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25
1: Estimates of Eq. (15) and (16) (OLS, fixed effects):
it i i it i it j D c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( 3 2 1 ε + + + =

it i i it it i it j D c ERV c j TI c c j b ) ( ] ) ( log[ ) ( ˆ
4 3 2 1 ε + + + + =
Exchange rate volatility  it ERV  for candidate country i at quarter t is defined as standard deviations in
percent from average nominal exchange rates against ECU/euro over preceding 12 months   
Source: Author’s computations.28   Ian Babetskii
Estimates of shock asymmetry are unavailable for Bulgaria and Lithuania, due to their short GDP
time series. On the other hand, we exclude the series of trade intensity for Slovenia due to a lack
of variation. Hence, we are left with seven CEECs to analyze the effect of trade on shock
asymmetry. Table 7 shows that there is strong negative correlation between trade intensity and
shock asymmetry on the demand side: more trade intensity means lower asymmetry. On the
supply side, the correlation is close to zero and insignificant (Germany) or positive (EU). A
similar pattern follows from the country-by-country estimates of equation (14)
20.
The panel estimates of (15) do not qualitatively change the results. An increase in trade intensity
is associated with higher symmetry of demand shocks; the link with supply shocks is ambiguous
(Table 8). The results for demand shocks are robust with respect to the three indicators of trade,
the two benchmarks (the EU aggregate and Germany), and the estimation method (country-
specific correlation coefficients or a panel framework). Demand shock convergence can be
interpreted as being due to trade and monetary integration. Since intra-industry trade accounts for
a large share of trade for the candidate countries, the total effect of trade on demand shock
symmetry is positive. The link between trade intensity and the correlation of demand shocks is
similar to the link between trade intensity and output correlation found by Frankel and Rose
(1998) and Fidrmuc (2001), among others. This is not surprising, given that demand shocks, by
construction, can have only short-term effects on output and prices.
On the supply side, asymmetries of shocks characterize the process of catching-up at work:
productivity gains in the candidate countries translate into increases in per capita incomes. Supply
shocks can be also interpreted in terms of Schumpeterian “innovations”, which are perceived as
an engine of technological progress
21. Higher trade intensity due to an increase in intra-industry
trade may be associated with more intensive restructuring, whence might follow the observed
positive impact of trade on supply shock asymmetry. On the other hand, higher trade intensity is
accompanied by lower shock asymmetry in a number of cases; the estimates depend on the
estimation method and on whether Germany or the EU is considered as the benchmark.
When exchange rate volatility is added, the coefficient of trade intensity does not change
significantly. A decrease in exchange rate volatility is accompanied by demand shock
convergence, while no notable effect on supply shocks is observed. The attempts by some
candidate countries to fix their currencies to the euro contribute to the synchronization of demand
shocks. To the extent that supply shocks have a long-term impact on output, there is no significant
impact of nominal exchange rate volatility on supply shock symmetry.
                                          
20 The results are not shown since in the case of two variables the correlation coefficient and OLS regression
give almost the same information.
21 Schumpeter (1943). See Hénin (1997) and Hospers (2003) for a review.EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   29
5. Conclusion
This paper supports the view about demand shock convergence and divergence of supply shocks
between the candidate countries, the EU-15, and Germany as alternative benchmarks. Estimated
time-varying coefficients of shock asymmetry are then confronted with several indicators of
bilateral trade intensity and exchange rate volatility. The results for demand shocks support
Frankel and Rose’s (1998) endogeneity argument, according to which international trade links
synchronize business cycles. In terms of demand shocks, countries are more likely to satisfy
criteria for monetary union membership ex post, as economic integration deepens. On the supply
side, the link between shock asymmetry and trade integration is ambiguous. Higher trade intensity
may be accompanied by both supply shock symmetry and asymmetry. Nevertheless, there are a
number of considerations which complicate the interpretation of the results.
First, there is no consensus in the literature on which shocks, i.e. supply or demand, are more
relevant for assessing the costs of joining the EMU
22. The optimum currency area theory says that
the more symmetric are the shocks (implying both supply and demand disturbances) between
countries, the less costly is forgoing an autonomous monetary policy
23. The empirical studies do
not make a clear point either. Often there is simply no discussion of the importance of various
types of shocks. Two different points of view equally exist. For example, for Fidrmuc and
Korhonen (2001, p. 21) supply shocks are “more relevant in assessing the costs and benefits of
different exchange rate regimes. Supply shocks have permanent output effects, whereas demand
shocks have only transitory effects.” On the other hand, according to Babetskii, Boone and
Maurel (2003, p. 24), “the absence of supply shock convergence is not necessarily bad from the
point of view of EMU memberships. Emerging countries (…), by fixing nominal exchange rates,
have simply to let productivity gains translate into inflation differentials (…).”
Second, the relationship between business cycle indicators (e.g. the correlation of de-trended
economic activity) and supply and demand shocks is not straightforward. For example, Fidrmuc
and Korhonen (2001) mention the puzzling behavior of Slovenia, which has highly correlated
business cycles with the euro area but poorly correlated both demand and supply shocks. Given
that business cycles consist of a mixture of shocks and responses, the same level of business cycle
synchronization can be observed in two opposite cases: similar shocks and similar responses, and
asymmetric shocks and asymmetric responses. The Slovenian example illustrates the last case.
Generally, it is also difficult to quantify the impact of policy-induced responses to exogenous
shocks on the estimation results (see Kenen, 2001).
Due to the above problems, and given that there is a relatively low robustness of the results among
different studies, the policy recommendations should be mentioned with caution. One
interpretation of the results is that that pegging national currencies to the euro or even entering the
EMU would not be so costly for the candidate countries in terms of the costs associated with
                                          
22 See Gros and Thygesen (1999, pp. 277–280) for a discussion of the effects of various shocks in the context of
the OCA theory.
23 Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) use an example of export demand shocks to illustrate the basic OCA
principles. Kenen (1969) makes a further distinction between demand and technology disturbances.30   Ian Babetskii
demand shock asymmetry. Indeed, the EU candidate countries are characterized by levels of
supply and demand shock asymmetries comparable to those for present EU member countries
such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. However, one should bear in mind that a closed economy
approach does not allow us to distinguish between domestic and foreign shocks. Therefore, we
may observe more convergence or more symmetry than in the case of “pure domestic” shocks.
Furthermore, the importance of the OCA criteria to the analysis of membership in a monetary
union should not be overemphasized. The degree of symmetry of contemporaneous shocks is only
one aspect of the costs associated with monetary union membership. There might be other costs of
EMU accession of at least the same importance as dissimilarity of shocks, for example, the
incompatibility of the current Maastricht inflation criteria with the catching-up objective
24. The
still existing substantial asymmetries, in terms of shocks, among the present EMU countries
suggest that this is probably not the most important criterion. Another way of looking at shock
asymmetries is to recall the risk-sharing argument proposed by Mundell (1973) and recently
discussed by McKinnon (2002, p. 344)
25. Asymmetric shocks are not necessarily bad: “asset
holding for international risk sharing is better served by a common currency spanning a wide area
– within which countries or regions could be, and perhaps should best be, quite different.”
                                          
24 See Buiter and Grafe (2002).
25 See also Nuti (2002).EU Enlargement and Endogeneity of some OCA Criteria: Evidence from the CEECs   31
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